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Experimentation on Minors: Whatever Happened to
Prince v. Massachusetts?
Annina M. Mitchell*
[Iln eighteenth century England . . . Caroline, Princess of
Wales, "begged the lives" of six condemned criminals for experimental smallpox vaccination before submitting her own
children to the procedure. (She also procured, for further trial,
"half a dozen of the charity children belonging to St. James'
parish.")'
Our system of "volunteering" children as experimental subjects
has not changed very much since the days of Caroline, Princess of
Wales. Although the field of medical research has become much
more sophisticated and institutionalized, our methods of selecting
children as subjects remain the same, which is to say that there are
no established methods of selection. Parents and legal guardians
(often including institutional custodians) continue to exercise their
own individual judgment as to whether or not minors under their
control will be used as research subjects, despite the fact that their
legal authority to do so has never been clearly established.'
Although a few commentators have considered the issue of the use
of minors in clinical investigation, 3 the starting point for their discussion has been an assumption that there is a need for human
experimentation on children if medical knowledge is to expand and
progress. This assumption, while undoubtedly true, glosses over the
*

Law clerk to Justice Swenson, Michigan Supreme Court.

1. Lasagna, Special Subjects in Human Experimentation, 98 DAEDALUS 449 (1969).
2. The guardian's "right" to give third party consent on behalf of a minor for purposes of
experimentation is usually justified as an extension of the right to consent to normal medical
treatment. See text accompanying notes 31-37 infra.
3. See, e.g., H. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL 63-69 (1970); Capron, Legal ConsiderationsAffecting Clinical PharmacologicalStudies in Children,21 CLINICAL RESEARCH 141
(1973); Curran & Beecher, Experimentationin Children, 210 J.A.M.A. 77 (1969); Fletcher,
Human Experimentation: Ethics in the Consent Situation, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 620
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher]; Lasagna, Special Subjects in Human Experimentation, 98 DAEDALUS 449 (1969); Lowe, Alexander & Mishkin, Nontherapeutic Research on
Children: An Ethical Dilemma, 84 J. PED. 468 (1974); Marston, Research on Minors,
Prisonersand the Mentally I1, 288 NEW ENG. J. MED. 158 (1973); Note, Experimentationon
Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99 (1967). See generally J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH
HUMAN BEINGS (1972); M. PAPPWORTH, HUMAN GUINEA PIGS (1967).
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underlying issue of whether we should be committed to the goal of
medical progress at any price. More and more frequently, the answer is becoming a reluctant "no." In regard to all special subjects
of human experimentation-prisoners, children and mental patients-there is an increasing awareness that some regrettable, but
necessary, limits must be placed on medical progress through experimentation. It is now becoming recognized that, in certain instances, the costs-in terms of personal integrity and autonomy-may
otherwise be too dear.'
The problems raised by non-therapeutic research (experimentation) on minors have recently been characterized as presenting a
two-fold dilemma: first, the legal question of whether parents and
guardians have legal authority to consent to the inclusion of minors
in experimentation; secondly, the ethical question of whether, and
under what conditions they should consent, even given legal authority to do so. 5 These matters raise difficult questions which, heretofore, have been politely discussed and then shoved under the table
by medical, legal and ethical writers and practitioners. Even though
there has been a rapid expansion of clinical research as a branch of
medicine in the last fifty years,6 the law has lagged far behind in the
entire area of human experimentation. 7 Sparse literature on human
4. The issue is clear; if children cannot participate in research, we can make little
progress toward the goal of improved diagnosis, prevention, treatment, or understanding of children's diseases. But the establishment of need is not sufficient; the doctrine
of utility and the concept of public need neither overcome the ethical issues nor substitute for legal sanction.
Lowe, Alexander & Mishkin, Nontherapeutic Research on Children: An Ethical Dilemma,
84 J. PFD. 468, 469 (1974).
5. Id. For the most part, this article addresses only the first of these questions.
6. The field of medical research has burgeoned at an astounding rate since World War II.
One key impetus to that growth is the increasing expenditure of federal monies to support
clinical investigation. Ratnoff & Smith, Human Laboratory Animals: Martyrs for Medicine,
36 FORDHAM L. REV. 673, 675 (1968). Between 1945 and 1965 the yearly expenditures of the
National Institutes of Health for medical research and development increased more than
60,000%. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1355 (1966).
This sum redoubled between 1965 and 1972, with a national total of 3.3 billion dollars from
all sources expended for medical research and development in 1972 alone. DIvISION OF RESEARCH GRANTS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, BASIC DATA RELATING TO THE NATIONAL INSTI-

OF HEALTH 6-7 (1972). No doubt the growth has also been aided by increased funding
of research by private industry, most notably the drug industry which has manufactured and
marketed a phenomenal number of new drugs since World War II. Reports of the Federal
Trade Commission reveal that the drug industry earmarked 800 million dollars for research
and development in 1974 alone. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 24, 1974, at 36.
7. The consequences of such a hands-off attitude toward medical research have been aptly
predicted by one writer as follows:
TUTES
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experimentation appears in legal periodicals 8 and few courts have
considered
issues it raises.'
The casesthewhich
have spoken in terms of experimentation are
largely irrelevant to the issues surrounding clinical investigation as
it is practiced today. They involved gross deviations from accepted
methods of treatment for the physical ills of individual patients
which constituted nothing less than pure quackery. In Carpenter v.
Blake,'" for example, the defendant physician set Carpenter's fracThe problem is that if the law does not become involved with scientific advances, and
begin to anticipate them and plan for them, scientists and medical investigators will
tend to ignore the law during their research phase and make the law de facto irrelevant
to their discoveries and achievements.
Annas, Medical Remedies and Human Rights: Why Civil Rights Lawyers Must Become
Involved in Medical Decision-Making, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS 151, 153 (1972).
8. But see Kaplan, Experimentation-An Articulation of a New Myth, 46 NEB. L. REV.
87 (1967); Ladimer, Socio-Medico-LegalAspects of Human Experimentation,3 J. PuB. L. 467
(1954); Medical Progress and the Law, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 561 (1967); Morse, Legal
Implications of Clinical Investigation, 20 VAND. L. REv. 747 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Morse]. Symposium: Psychosurgery, 54 B.U.L. REV. 215 (1974); A Symposium: Some Legal
Problems in Medical Treatment and Research, 36 FORD. L. REV. 631 (1968); Comment,
Behavior Modification and Other Legal Imbroglios of Human Experimentation, 52 J. URBAN
L. 155 (1974); Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99 (1967); Comment, Non-Therapeutic Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 24 S'R. L. REV. 1067
(1973); 20 WAYNE L. REv. 1309 (1974).
9. Undoubtedly, some of the reticence of the law to involve itself with human experimentation is due to the immensity and complexity of the area. In experimentation as in anything
else, the conclusions one reaches may, in large part, depend upon how the subject matter is
defined for analysis. The term "human experimentation" potentially covers a broad range of
activities, with clinical studies of accumulated data, e.g., personal or medical histories, educational and social background, responses to psychological questionnaires at one end of the
spectrum, involving no physical invasion of the subject's body. At the other end are grossly
invasive surgical procedures and the administration of chemicals. See Freund, Ethical Problems in Human Experimentation, 273 NEW ENG. J. MED. 687, 689 (1965). Whether or not a
particular activity constitutes an experiment could also be made to depend on the primary
purpose for which it is undertaken. D. MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW 71 (1970).
Since this article approaches consent for experimentation in terms of benefit to the individual, the term "experimentation" as used herein embraces all attempts to induce, alter or
monitor bodily or mental functions where the activity is not reasonably likely to result in the
treatment of a condition from which the subject is suffering. Under this view, experimentation could include, among other things: a) deviations from accepted modes of treatment of a
specific illness; b) attempts at therapy for conditions for which there is no accepted mode of
treatment; c) the use of drugs and other procedures, not for immediate therapy, but for the
improvement of sufferers of a specific condition who may or may not include the subject of
the experiment; d) the use of healthy persons as subjects or unhealthy persons whose ailment
is irrelevant to the goals of the particular activity. Id. To this list formulated by Meyers, I
would add e) the use of drugs and other procedures in attempts to "treat" persons allegedly
suffering from mental "illnesses." See text accompanying notes 53-57 infra.
10. 60 Barb. 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds, 50 N.Y. 696 (1872).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 919

tured elbow using a new and questionable procedure. In addition to
holding that a doctor must use modes of treatment which comport
with accepted and established medical procedures, the court blanketly warned that the physician who experiments does so at his
peril. " This strict liability view of experimentation was tempered in
1935 by Fortner v. Koch,'2 currently regarded as the seminal case
in the area of human experimentation. In much-quoted dicta, the
Michigan Supreme Court stated:
We recognize the fact that, if the general practice of medicine
and surgery is to progress, there must be a certain amount of
experimentation carried on; but such experiments must be
done with the knowledge and consent of the patient . . . and
must not vary too radically from the accepted method of procedure. '1
In Fortner, the defendant physician had employed a novel
method of diagnosis and treatment for what was later found to be
syphillis, despite the fact that a proven diagnostic technique (Wasserman test) was available. Like Carpenter, the case involved actions bordering on quackery by an individual doctor during the
course of treating a single patient's physical ailment.' 4 The Michigan court seemed to go no further than to impose a standard of
reasonableness upon doctors who deviate from accepted treatment
techniques. 11
11. Id. at 514. In a similar case, Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767), the
defendants, who used a novel procedure and instrument in an attempt to straighten a poorlymending broken leg, were held liable to the plaintiff, with the court noting that they were
unwise in their choice of the experimental device. Id. at 862, The "physician's peril" doctrine
announced in Carpenterwas echoed by the court in Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213, 281
S.W. 681 (1926):
A failure to employ the methods followed or approved by his school of practice evidences either ignorance or experimentation on his part. The law tolerates neither.
Id. at 685.
12. 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
13. Id. at 282, 261 N.W. at 765. These words have been interpreted both as encouragement
of and as a limit on medical experimentation, depending on the writer's perspective. See
Curran, Governmental Regulation of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Research: The
Approach of Two FederalAgencies, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTs 402 (P. Freund
ed. 1970); Morse, supra note 8, at 759.
14. See also Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 8 P.2d 109 (1932); Graham v. Dr. Pratt
Institute, 163 Il. App. 91 (1911).
15. This approach has been followed by other courts since Fortner. See, e.g., Board of
Med. Registration & Examination v. Kaadt, 225 Ind. 625, 76 N.E.2d 669 (1948). See also
Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 535, 39 P. 577, 580 (1895) (a physician who employs a
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To date, Kaimowitz v. Departmentof Mental Healthl" is the first,
but certainly not the last, 7 case in which a court has been faced
squarely with a situation involving clinical research. The proposed
subject, an inmate at state mental institutions for over 15 years,
signed a consent form authorizing doctors to implant electrodes in
his brain and then perform psychosurgery (selective destruction of
brain tissue) in an attempt to "cure" him of allegedly aggressive
behavior. 8 The court, after finding that the proposed procedure was
experimental, held that the subject could not give informed consent
to the psychosurgery. 9
The focus of the Kaimowitz court on consent is, in large part, a
result of its adoption of the Nuremberg Code.20 These ten principles,
contained in the final judgment of one of the war-crime trials, represent one of the many sets of ethical codes intended to guide those
conducting research on humans. 21 As litigation in the area of medimethod of treatment other than one already established has the burden to "justify his experiment by some reasonable theory"). It should be noted that these early "experimentation" cases are largely after-the-fact damage actions based on negligence theories. It has
been suggested that this method of recovery in tort for damages caused may alone be insufficient to compensate subjects of experimentation, giving the burden imposed on the plaintiff to prove deviation from the standard of accepted medical practice in carrying out the
experiment. See, e.g., Comment, Medical Experiment Insurance, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 965
(1970); Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99, 113 (1967); Comment,
Non-Therapeutic Research Involving Human Subjects, 24 SYm. L. REV. 1067, 1091 (1973).
16. Civil No. 19,434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., July 10, 1973).
17. See Clay v. Martin, 509 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1975); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1973). Both cases reversed dismissals of complaints by prisoners concerning their
inclusion in drug experiments, allegedly without their informed consent.
18. The court rejected the argument of the defendant physicians that the proposed surgery was a form of therapy, largely because of the lack of knowledge about the relationship
between behavior and certain brain components, and because of the lack of any demonstrable
medical benefit which would accrue to the subject.
19. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 19,434-AW, slip. op. at 27-29
(Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., July 10, 1973). That conclusion was based on the lack of voluntariness (because of the inherently coercive institutional environment) and the lack of knowledge about the procedure's effects and risks. See Symposium: Psychosurgery, 54 B.U.L. REV.
215 (1974); 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1309 (1974). The doctrine of informed consent was used by the
court as the touchstone in the experimental situation to flatly prohibit the class of institutionalized persons from being contemplated as potential "volunteers' for psychosurgery.
20. United States v. Karl Brandt, Trials of War CriminalsBefore the Nurem berg Military
Tribunals, 2 THE MEDICAL CASE 181 (1948).
21. Other examples of professional codes include the American Medical Association's
Ethical Guidelines for Clinical Investigation, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL
9-11 (1969); the American Psychological Association's Ethical Standardsof Psychologists, 18
AM. PSYCHOL. 56 (1963); and the World Medical Association's Declarationof Helsinki, reprinted in 271 NEW ENG. J. MED. 473 (1964). See text accompanying notes 26-38 infra.
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cal experimentation increases, courts, given the sparse common law
guides, may feel constrained to turn to these codes in their efforts
to sort out the applicable legal issues and standards.
With regard to children as experimental subjects, a literal reading
of the first principle of the Nuremberg Code appears to preclude the
use of any minor in medical experimentation since, in most jurisdictions, they lack legal capacity to give consent.2 The first principle
reads in part:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other
ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. 3
Even if minors were made legally capable of giving consent, the
question in each case would remain as to whether the child proposed
as an experimental subject has "sufficient knowledge and comprehension . . . as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision."'"
Despite the fact that the text of the Nuremberg Code does not
affirmatively allow for proxy consent by a legal guardian on behalf
of a ward, the principal drafters of the Code have maintained that
third-party consent was not meant to be proscribed by the first
principle. Andrew Ivy, Chief Medical Consultant to the War Crimes
Trials at Nuremberg, wrote in 1948, the same year the Code was
published:
The ethical principles involved in the use of the mentally incompetent are the same as for mentally competent persons.
The only difference involves the matter of consent. Since mental cases are likened to children in an ethical and legal sense,
the consent of the guardian is required. 5
H. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL 231 (1970); Fletcher, supra note 3, at 638.
23. United States v. Karl Brandt, Trialsof War CriminalsBefore the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals, 2 THE MEDICAL CASE 181 (1948), reprinted in J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH
HUMAN BEINGS 305 (1972).
24. Id. See Curran & Beecher, Experimentation in Children, 210 J.A.M.A. 77, 80 (1969).
25. Ivy, The History of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation, 108
22.
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The ambiguity in the Nuremberg Code vis 6 vis children is not
present in the other major code of medical ethics, the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki." Section III, 3b of that
code declares, much like the Nuremberg Code, that: "The subject
of clinical research should be in such a mental, physical and legal
state as to be able to exercise fully his power of choice.""
However, a prior section (3a), in clear contradiction, sanctions
proxy consent in some situations by stating that:
Clinical research on a human being cannot be undertaken
without his free consent, after he has been fully informed; if he
is legally incompetent
the consent of the legal guardian should
2
be procured. '
Experimentation on children is, therefore, apparently approved of
by these guidelines, if the consent of the subject's legal guardian is
obtained. Unsurprisingly, the professional codes place no real limits
on the power of researchers to select which children will be used as
subjects, or for what purposes and in what manner the informed
consent of legal guardians will be procured. 2 None of these profesSCIENCE 1 (1948). See also Alexander, Psychiatry: Methods and Processes for Investigation of
Drugs, 169 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCIENCE 347 (1970).

26. Reprinted in 271 NEw ENG. J. MED. 473 (1964).
27. Id,at 474.
28. Id,
29. The inadequacies of present forms of professional self-regulation have been succinctly
described by Professor Jay Katz as follows:
I am not unduly impressed by the assertion that this research [at Willowbrook State
Hospital] was carried out in fidelity to codes of ethics or with the approval of review
committees. As I have said elsewhere, codes, as long as they stand alone and are not
surrounded by detailed commentary, remain pious exercises of limited value. Since
they aspire to ideals and are divorced from the realities of human capacities, e.g., to
communicate, to comprehend and to act responsibly, they invite judicious and nonjudicious neglect. Similarly, since members of review committees have not given systematic thought to the problems raised by investigative medicine, their approval of
research projects often turns out to be as questionable as the activities of individual
investigators acting on their own.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION-THE CASE OF

WILLOW3ROOK STATE HOSPITAL RESEARCH 33 (1972).

1
Nor, presumably, were the various codes ever intended to place any real restrictions on the
researcher's power within the experimental situation. Both the drafters and the endorsers
clearly perceive clinical investigation as one facet of the usual doctor/patient relationship, one
which has traditionally been free from any outside control. The obvious reason for this "inhouse" approach has been understated as follows:
It is significant that none of the declarations speak to any form of control by groups
other than doctors or scientists. The possibility that lay control may be imposed upon
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sional codes of ethics have the force of law. Consequently, legal
authority for the inclusion of minors in experimentation must be
sought elsewhere.
Under the common law, consent is a valid defense to an action
for the tort of battery. In the traditional doctor-patient relationship,
a "touching" by a doctor in the form of administering medical treatment may be done only with prior consent.30 The requirement of the
consent of the individual is dispensed with only in a few limited
situations. One of these is where the person to be touched is legally
incompetent to give valid consent. This latter category includes
children, for whom the substituted consent of the parent or guardian
(not that of the person to be treated) is required in order to avoid
tort liability."
medical research workers could cause much apprehension to physicians.
Ratnoff & Smith, Human Laboratory Animals: Martyrs for Medicine, 36 FORDHAM L. REV.
673, 682 (1968).
The self-serving assumption that the medical experimentation situation is equitable with
the normal medical treatment situation conveniently obfuscates the very real differences
between the doctor/patient and researcher/subject relationships, including the vastly different goals, motivations and influences at work in each. See Guttentag, The Problem of Experimentation on Human Beings: The Physician's Point of View, 117 SCIENCE 207, 210 (1953).
One writer has stressed that the traditional deference paid the doctor/patient relationship has
no place in the experimental setting:
The responsibility of the individual to an individual patient has been clearly defined,
maturely considered, and almost universally accepted; it has been tried and found
good. Deliberate experimentation would seem to introduce a break with the accepted
type and a replacement by so-called responsibility, which should be deeply and rightly
distrusted-the sort of thing that is called the duty of scientific man to society and
the obligation of individuals to the race, under which all sorts of monstrosities have
been practiced in absolutist states.
Shimkin, The Problem of Experimentation on Human Beings: The Research Worker's Point
of View, 117 SCIENCE 205 (1953).
30. See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971). To be valid, the consent given must meet the
requirements of informed consent, i.e., the consent must be knowing and voluntary and the
person must be capable of giving the consent. Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99
(1935); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 19,434 (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co.,
Mich., July 10, 1973); see Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 465 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV.
628 (1970).
31. Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935) (liability for performing tonsillectomy on minor without parental consent); Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936)
(defendant liable in battery for amputating foot of 14 year old accident victim without
parental consent). In some jurisdictions, exceptions to this rule have been carved out where
the person, even though a minor, was deemed mature enough to understand the consequences
of her actions and did, in fact, give consent to the medical treatment. Bakker v. Welsh, 144
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The existing case law adopting proxy consent on behalf of minors,
however, is limited to instances in which valid consent was (or was
not) obtained for customary medical treatment-a procedure undertaken as therapy for a specific physical ailment. To date, no
court has directly spoken to the issue of whether a parent has the
legal authority to independently consent to any procedure which is
not for the minor's medical benefit, i.e., a physical touching involving a minor which is not reasonably intended or expected to cure or
ameliorate a physical illness.32
The case most often cited by proponents of medical experimentation on minors as legal authority to experiment with parental consent is Bonner v. Moran." In Bonner, a fifteen year old consented
to be a donor of skin for grafts onto his severely burned cousin
without his parent's consent. In a subsequent action for assault and
battery, the lower court instructed the jury that their verdict must
be for the defendant doctor if the minor was capable of consenting
to the operation and did so consent. A judgment for the defendant
was reversed by the court of appeals which held that the consent of
the parent was also necessary. 4 The court placed strong emphasis
on the fact the procedures to which the minor in Bonner was subjected were not for his personal medical benefit.35 This point has
been stressed by William Curran and Henry Beecher, who argue
that Bonner thereby implicitly recognizes that minors may be subjected to physical interventions not for their benefit as long as parental consent is obtained. 31 Such broad interpretation of the case
appears to be a gross overreading. The narrow holding of the court
is a far cry from explicit authorization to parents to independently
Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906) (17 year old validly consented to surgery for removal of ear
tumor); Gulf & S.I.R.R. v. Sullivan, 155 Miss. 1, 119 So. 501 (1928) (no liability for injuries
to arm from vaccination to which mature 17 year old consented); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio
St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956) (18 year old gave valid consent to plastic surgery).
32. But see the transplantation cases cited in note 46 infra, in which a non-beneficial
physical intrusion was allowed with parental consent, the consent of the child-donor and with
prior court scrutiny. A benefit analysis was purportedly used, but interpreted broadly so that
the avoidance of possible psychological trauma was sufficient "benefit" to the minor donor..
33. 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
34. Id. at 122.
35. Id. at 123.
36. Curran & Beecher, Experimentationin Children, 210 J.A.M.A. 77, 79 (1969). See also
Consent of Minors to Medical Treatment, in A REVIEW OF LEGAL PRECEDENTS AND MEDICAL
ETHICS INVOLVED IN INTERVENTION WITH CHILDREN AT RISK FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA (Appendix III)
13 (1973).
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volunteer their children for non-beneficial physical intrusions.3 7
Such a reading is also contrary to the notion of physical inviolability which underlies the law38 and is reflected by the careful restriction of proxy consent to a physical invasion in cases involving necessary medical treatment. The allowance of third party consent must
be based on the requirement that the person giving consent do so
on behalf of the ward, solely motivated by the person's best interests.3 ' This means that a legal guardian should not be able to consent to a physical touching which is not necessary for the benefit of
the child. Consequently, only physical interventions necessary for
the improvement of a child's health lie within the scope of authority
of parents and legal guardians."
37. See Capron, Legal Considerations Affecting Clinical PharmacologicalStudies in
Children, 21 CLINICAL RESEARCH 141 (1973).
38. As Justice Cardozo articulated in Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosps., 211 N.Y.
125, 126, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body."
39. Morse, supra note 8, at 755; Comment, Non-TherapeuticResearch Involving Human
Subjects, 24 SYR. L. REV. 1067. 1075 (1973).
40. One writer has suggested that this line of reasoning underlies the preclusion of proxy
consent in Kaimowitz:
[I]f Kaimowitz is suggesting that experimental psychosurgery is a no-benefit, highrisk procedure to which patients should not be induced to submit, the preclusion of
guardian consent would follow from the proposition that guardians may not subject
their wards to harmful or non-therapeutic experimentation.
Wexler, Mental Health Law and the Movement Toward Voluntary Treatment, 62 CALIF. L.
REv. 671, 681 n.33 (1974).
The present lack of legal authority for parents to consent to non-beneficial intrusions has
been recognized by several experts in the area, including Donald Chalkley of the National
Institute of Mental Health:
A parent has no legal right to give consent for the involvement of his child in an activity
not for the benefit of that child. No legal guardian, no person standing in loco parentis
has that right. Unfortunately, investigators not knowledgeable of the law have asked
for consent and parents, legal guardians and institutional superintendents have been
giving it, even when the activities were not intended solely to benefit the child.
Chalkley, Developing Guidelines, 21 CLINICAL RESEARCH 777, 779 (1973). The same conclusion
was reached by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in its proposed regulations
for the protection of human subjects in federally funded research:
Parents and legal guardians have authority to consent on behalf of their child or ward
to established therapeutic procedures when the child is suffering from an illness, even
though the treatment might involve some risk.
There is no firm legal basis, however, for parental or guardian consent to participation in research on behalf of subjects who are incompetent, by virtue of age or mental
state, to understand the information provided and to formulate the judgments on
which valid consent must depend.
38 Fed. Reg. 31,738-39 (1973). See also Marston, Medical Science, the Clinical Trial and
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This "benefit" approach, although not without its own problems,
appears to be the one most consonant with the common law protection of a persons bodily integrity. It forms the basis for the currently
pending case of Neilsen v. Board of Regents," one of the first cases"2
in which a court has been called upon to rule directly on the issue
of parental consent to physical intrusions on minors which are not
for their direct medical benefit." In Neilsen, the plaintiff is seeking
to bar the use of normal, healthy infants (ages 2 months to 4 years)
as controls in a childhood asthma research study. Blood samples
were to be drawn, and several drugs injected, to test the children's
tolerance to various substances and stresses. The parents had signed
consent forms and were to be paid $300 for a child's participation.
The suit itself is not based on any lack of informed consent on the
part of the parents; indeed, the parents of these minors are named
defendants. The Neilsen plaintiff alleges that parents have no right
to authorize medical intrusions unrelated to improving the physical
well-being of their child.
The facts in Neilsen demonstrate a clear case of non-therapeutic
research." If the "benefit" analysis of proxy consent is adhered to,
Society, HOSPITAL TRIBUNE, Jan. 9, 1973, at 14; Hillman & Falk, Proposed Rules Set Guidelines for Clinical Research on Humans, 227 J.A.M.A. 13, 14 (1974); Human Experimentation,
MED. WORLD NEws, June 8, 1973, at 37.
41. Civil No. 665-049 (Super. Ct. San Francisco, Cal., filed Aug. 1973). See Is Research
on Children Illegal?, MED. WORLD NEws, Sept. 28, 1973, at 40.
42. The only other suit to do so is presently pending before a court of general jurisdiction
in Detroit, Michigan, Jobes v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 74-004-130-DC (Cir.
Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., filed Jan. 19, 1974). See text accompanying notes 50-53 infra.
43. The plaintiff's first cause of action alleges that the state defendants are illegally using
public funds to perform acts in contravention of CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1970):
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily
harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any
child, willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its
person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding 1 year, or in the state prison for not less than 1 year nor more than 10 years.
(2) Any person, who under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to
produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or
inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or
custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to
be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that
its person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
44. The term "nontherapeutic research" denotes that the subject is not reasonably expected to gain medical benefits as an immediate result of the study. Ratnoff & Smith, Human
Laboratory Animals: Martyrs for Medicine, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 673 (1968); Comment, NonTherapeutic Research Involving Human Subjects, 24 SYR. L. REV. 1067 (1973). For purposes
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the plaintiff in Neilsen should prevail, with the court holding directly that parents have no legal authority to consent to procedures
on minors which are not for their direct benefit, thereby precluding
all non-therapeutic research on minors. 5
If this focus on the benefit to the child as the determining factor
is adopted by the courts, as I believe it should be, it must not be
subverted by expanding notions of what constitutes a benefit to the
child.'" Under a strict interpretation of benefit, altruism or avoidance of possible psychological harm should not qualify." This would
clearly preclude research such as the now infamous study at the
Willowbrook School for the Retarded in which mentally retarded
children were given hepatitis with the hope that the research would
eventually lead to an effective vaccine. 8 Such studies cannot legally
be justified on the basis of any "indirect" benefit to accrue to the
children involved or a direct benefit to society as a whole.'"
of this paper, nontherapeutic research is interchangeable with the term experimentation. See
note 9 supra.
45. See note 40 supra.
46. Daube, Transplantation-Acceptabilityof Procedures and the Required Legal
Sanctions, in ETHICS INMEDICAL PROGRESS-WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TRANSPLANTATION 198
(1966). Such a perversion of the benefit analysis'has already occurred in several cases involving minors as donors of organs to siblings. Thus lower courts have held that a kidney could
be removed from a healthy minor for transplantation to his twin because it was predicted
that the failure to do so would result in "grave emotional impact" to the healthy child.
Masden v. Harrison, No. 6865 (Eq. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957). See also Hart v.
Brown, 29 Conn. Super. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972); Foster v. Harrison, No. 6874 (Eq. Mass.
Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20, 1957). Contra, In re Richardson, No. 6091 (La. Cir. Ct. App., Oct.
22, 1973). In Richardson, the court held that a parent could not validly consent to the removal of a kidney from one child for transplantation to his ailing sibling. Using the rationale
underlying a state law which prohibited parents from disposing of their child's property, the
court concluded:
Since the law affords this unqualified protection against intrusion into a comparatively
mere property right, it is incomprehensible to us that it affords less protection to a
minor's right to be free from bodily intrusion to the extent of loss of an organ unless
such loss be in the best interest of the minor.
Id. slip op. at 5.
47. Contra, Skegg, Consent to Medical Procedures on Minors, 36 MODERN L. REV. 370,
377-80 (1973).
48. For a sampling of the various views regarding the ethics of the Willowbrook experimentation see H. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL 67, 122-27 (1970); Lasagna, Special
Subjects in Human Experimentation, 98 DAEDALUS 449, 458 (1969); PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SYMPOSIUM ON ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, THE CASE OF WILLOWBROOK STATE
HOSPITAL RESEARCH (1972).
49. The complaint in Nielsen v. Board of Regents, Civil No. 665-049 (Super. Ct. San
Francisco, Cal., filed Aug. 1973) is glaringly inconsistent in this respect. It is critical to note
that the plaintiff in Nielsen is not objecting to the inclusion of the non-control children in
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Experimentation on minors institutionalized in state mental
health facilities is presently being challenged in Michigan in the
case of Jobes v. Departmentof Mental Health.0 The plaintiffs, two
minors incarcerated at Lafayette Clinic in Detroit, allege that there
is no legal authority for proxy consent to their subjection to medical
the proposed allergy study. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra. The latter group includes children who are classified as "at-risk" of becoming asthmatics, based on their family
medical histories. Nielsen implicitly presumes that, because of this factor, their parents do
have a right to consent to their subjection to the same risks, pain, fright and physical intrusions proposed for the "healthy" controls. Designation of one group of the children as potentially sick does not alter the fact that the research is clearly not going to result, nor is it
designed to result, in any direct medical benefit to the "at-risk" children or to the controls.
The study might admittedly produce findings which would ultimately aid asthma sufferers,
but it is clearly nontherapeutic research as to both classes of children. Parental consent, then,
is no more valid for the non-control children than for the others; all are being used as guinea
pigs for someone else's advantage-their parents', asthmatic children's, and the researchers'
perhaps, but decidedly not for their own benefit. Jobes v. Department of Mental Health,
Civil No. 74-004-130-DC (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., filed Jan. 19, 1974). The exact extent
to which institutionalized minors are used as subjects in nontherapeutic research is unknown.
The Children's Defense Fund of the Washington Research Project is currently compiling an
extensive report on experimentation on children, in part using data made available by the
federal government which funds much of the research. See note 6 supra.
Independent investigation in Michigan by myself and a colleague has revealed that from
1970-73 minors incarcerated in various state mental institutions were repeatedly used as
subjects in tests of numerous experimental vaccines, including those for mumps, rubella,
hepatitis, influenza and parainfluenza.
It would not be surprising to find that Michigan's institutions are not unique in this respect.
The reasons why captive populations are favorite targets for investigative medicine are not
difficult to discern. Incarcerated people are a self-contained, easily accessible group; they can
be monitored on a 24 hour basis over long periods of time frequently required by clinical
investigation; they live in stable environments in which such factors as sleep, diet, exercise
and social interaction can be easily altered by their institutional custodians; their availability
can be used to attract researchers, research money and drug manufacturers into understaffed
and underfinanced state facilities. "In short, they represent what the investigator likes to
have in his animal rooms and he is reasonably sure the animals will be there for some time."
Ritts, A Physician's View of Informed Consent in Human Experimentation, 36 FORDHAM L,
REV. 631, 637 (1968).
Incarcerated individuals are most likely to bear the brunt of the risks involved in clinical
investigation. Not surprisingly, the poor, the deviant and the mentally defective make up the
bulk of captive populations. See Horstman, Drug Experimentation and the Poor, 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 347 (1970). The allowance of nontherapeutic research, such as tests of
new drugs and vaccines on institutionalized persons, typifies what I call the doctrine of
expendability, referred to as the doctrine of utility by Lowe, Alexander & Mishkin,
Nontherapeutic Research on Children: An Ethical Dilemma, 84 J. PED. 468 (1974). The
insidious attitude underlying these doctrines views these disadvantaged groups as marginal
members of society who somehow owe it to the rest of us to make a worthwhile contribution.
See Ritts, supra at 637.
50. Civil No. 74-004-130-DC (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., filed Jan. 19, 1974).
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experimentation,' and that they themselves are incapable of giving
informed consent to the procedures because of the inherently coercive institutional environment in which it is being requested."
The children in Jobes clearly would not receive any direct medical
51. The two particular experiments proposed at Lafayette Clinic included one study of
the effects of administering zinc on the growth patterns of the children. The other experiment
was designed to test a hypothesized link between mental illness and the level of bufotenin in
the urine of the minors who were institutionalized for alleged emotional disturbances.
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Appendix Item H, Research Protocols. Jobes v. Department
of Mental Health, Civil No. 74-004-130-DC (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., filed Jan. 19, 1974).
Bufotenin levels have previously been the subject of clinical investigation employing adults
labelled as schizophrenics. See, e.g., Narasimhachari & Himwich, The Determination of
Bufotenin in Urine of Schizophrenic Patientsand Normal Controls, 9 J. PSYCHIAT. RESEARCH
113 (1972); Siriex & Marini, Studies on the Elimination of Bufotenin in Urine, 1 BEHAV.
NEUROPSYCH. 29 (1969). Both studies are clearly nontherapeutic since the subjects are not to
gain from them any medical benefit in the form of improving a condition from which they
are suffering and which necessitates medical attention. The first of the experiments readily
demonstrates the proclivity of clinical investigators to make use of institutionalized persons,
simply because they are accessible. See note 49 supra. The second demonstrates the ease with
which researchers can conduct experiments on persons once they are labelled as being "sick,"
if the experiment is performed under the free-flowing rubric of "treatment." See note 18 supra
and text accompanying notes 53-57 infra.
52. This argument draws on the reasoning of the court in Kaimowitz. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra. The plaintiffs also claim that the state defendants are acting in
violation of the constitutional rights of the children under the fourteenth amendment, alleging that they are being deprived of their rights to liberty and privacy. Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint at 11-12, Jobes v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 74-004-130-DC (Cir.
Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., filed Jan. 19, 1974). See Romano, Reflections on Informed Consent,
30 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 129, 132 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Romano]. See also Relf v.
Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974). On the day of the first hearing in Jobes, the
state attorney general sent a letter to the Director of the Department of Mental Health
advising him that:
The Department may not conduct experiments on [committed minors] unless the
particular experiment contributes directly to the individual minor's care and treatment.
Letter from Frank J. Kelley to E. G. Yudashkin, Feb. 19, 1974. Furthermore, the attorney
general cautioned that the decision in Kaimowitz would indicate that the children themselves
could not consent because of the "coercive atmosphere of a mental institution," and added:
While it is true that a parent can consent on behalf of a child to medical procedures
which are necessary to preserve the health of the child, e.g., Bakker v. Welsh, 144
Mich. 632 (1906), nationally, cases have held that this does not empower the parent
to make his child a guinea pig. The parent has no authority to subject his child to
medical procedures which are not designed primarily for the benefit of that child.
Id.
During the early stages of the litigation in Jobes, the plaintiffs and the state defendants
agreed to a consent order which would have prohibited experimentation on institutionalized
minors. The order, however, was never entered by the court due to the opposition of intervening defendants in the case, including the Michigan Association for Emotionally Disturbed
Children.
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benefit from the proposed procedures. 3 Besides the absence of any
benefit to them, there is also considerable doubt as to whether
there is a condition requiring any medical intrusions. Jobes directly
raises the question of what is treatment. But more importantly, it
questions whether there is anything to treat in the first place-i. e.,
whether being labelled as mentally ill or emotionally disturbed justifies the application of any medically intrusive procedure, usually
the administration of drugs.
One concomitant to the tort principle which permits proxy consent for accepted medical treatment" is the requirement that there
be a condition which necessitates a touching of the person in the
form of some attempt at treatment. In psychiatry, the existence of
a "disease" requiring treatment is, at best, questionable. The
"treatment" for an alleged mental illness may involve chemotherapy, electroshock, or surgery on the brain.55 Whether the application
of any of these techniques results in a medical benefit to a particular
recipient is rightly a subject for large doses of skepticism, given the
nebulous and value-laden nature of psychiatry itself.5 The requirement of direct benefit to a child before proxy consent to a physical
intrusion is valid cannot be deemed to be satisfied by a mere assertion that a child is mentally ill or emotionally disturbed. 7
53. Not only does inclusion in the bufotenin study result in violation of the bodily integrity of the children and no direct medical benefit to the children, but it can lead to mislabelling by researchers which has serious social and legal consequences. See generally IssuES IN
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHILDREN (N. Hobbs ed. 1975).
54. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
55. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 19,434-AW (Cir. Ct.
Wayne Co., Mich., July 10, 1973). See also Note, Conditioningand Other Technologies Used
to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisonersand Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.
616 (1972).
56. Perhaps in psychiatry, more than in other branches of medicine, one senses
deep concern with matters of personal liberty, civil rights, freedom of the individual
to make his choices of health services as well as participating in human experimentation.
Romano, supra note 52, at 131.
57. For example, a debate currently rages among medical experts over whether hyperkinesis in children (alternately called hyperactivity or minimal brain dysfunction) is a condition
requiring the application of any kind of medical "treatment." Even those who believe that
there is such a "disease" decry attempts to "treat" it with drugs. See Grinspoon & Singer,
Amphetamines in the Treatment of Hyperkinetic Children, 43 HARV. ED. REV. 515 (1973);
Sroufe & Stewart, Treating Problem Children with Stimulant Drugs, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED.
407 (1973); Vonder Harr, Chaining Children with Chemicals, THE PROGRESSIVE, March, 1975,
at 13. Yet hundreds of thousands of schoolchildren are currently receiving daily doses of
stimulant drugs, primarily methylphenidate hydrochloride, in what could be the largest
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Focusing on the presence or absence of a direct medical benefit
to determine whether there is legal authority for proxy consent to
any physical touching raises some tough problems of line-drawing.
The most difficult of these would arise in the traditional doctor/patient situation where a physician attempts to treat a physical
ailment with unproven measures. Where established methods of
treatment are already available and are not medically contraindicated, there is no reason why the child patient should not have the
benefits of those established therapies. When their use proves ineffective (or when no accepted mode of treatment exists), unproven
techniques may be called for. But even within the normal setting
of the doctor/patient relationship, some attempts at "therapy" cannot reasonably be expected to result in a direct medical benefit to
a child in the form of improvement in her condition. At some point,
then, the possibility of effectiveness becomes so remote that no
benefit can be said to be present. The mere existence of a potential
benefit cannot in and of itself be used to avoid the strictures of a
rule which prohibits proxy consent to a procedure which is not for
the direct benefit of the child.
The proposition that proxy consent cannot be obtained for nontherapeutic research on minors no doubt will be viewed with great
distaste by those who consider the perceived needs of society as
paramount to the rights of particular members of that society. 5 The
law, however, has traditionally been acutely sensitive to ensuring
that the individual is protected from the whims and impositions of
the majority, even those magnanimously couched in terms of sacrifice for the greater good. Tort law, in particular, has consistently
nontherapeutic research study ever conducted by the drug industry. Likewise, psychosurgery
on children under the protective guise of providing "treatment" for hyperactivity constitutes
a gross example of illegal and unjustifiable experimentation. See Andy, Hyperresponsive
Syndrome, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE 2ND INTERNATIONAL CONF. ON PSYCHOSURGERY (1970); Andy,
Thalamotomy in Hyperactive and Aggressive Behavior, 32 CONFIN. NEUROL. 322 (1970);
Balasumbramaniam, Surgical Treatment of Hyperkinetic and Behavior Disorders, 54 INT.
SURGERY 18 (1970); Breggin, The Return of Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, 118 CONG. REC.
E1602 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972); Restak, The Promise and Peril of Psychosurgery, SATURDAY
REV., Sept. 25, 1973, at 54.
58. To the inevitable argument that the exclusion of minors as organ donors will greatly
hamper medical advancement in the area of transplantation, one writer has responded:
If this is so, it is regrettable, but medical progress must then be hampered ...
Anyway, I do not believe that anyone has the right to dispose of an organ simply
because this is a child.
Daube, Transplantation-Acceptabilityof Procedure and the Required Legal Sanctions, in
ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS-WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TRANSPLANTATION 199 (1966).
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recognized that persons should only endure those bodily intrusions
which they have freely chosen. The common law does not inquire
as to whether the majority would consent to a similar physical intrusion or as to whether most people think a person should allow the
physical touching. Instead, the inquiry is narrowly and appropriately focused on the wishes of the individual. The allowance for
proxy consent is a limited exception to that rule. The exception
neither negates the principles underlying the law of assault and
battery, nor gives free rein to guardians to approve of any and all
invasions of the ward's personal integrity. This proposition is not a
revoluntary one; it was succintly stated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Prince v. Massachusetts" as follows:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow [that] they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the
age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice
for themselves. 0
Likewise, those who are motivated by the desire to serve humanity through the advancement of medicine have no greater rights to
determine which individuals shall make the sacrifice." Like it or
not, medical investigators must come to recognize that "for the
greater good" is just not good enough:
It is essential that while humanity and science are served, the
individual's rights must be protected with vigor and vigilance.
If this means that certain experiments cannot be conducted, it
is appropriate that they are not. Medical scientists in the laboratory are privileged to embrace an operative pragmatism during the continuum of inductive and deductive reasoning, intuition, imagination and possibly even serendipity that comprise
the scientific method. Occasionally, the means and the end are
blurred and may even be indistinguishable. In the clinical experiment with human subjects this facile laboratory stratagem
cannot be permitted, for here the end can never justify the
means if human rights and dignity are violated. There is a
special meaning for the scientist in this cliche, for he above all
59. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
60. Id. at-170.
61. Whoever gave the investigator the god-like right of choosing martyrs?" Beecher,
Consent in Clinical Experimentation:Myth and Reality, 195 J.A.M.A. 34, 35 (1966).
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others exalts in his freedom to seek the truth of life and he is
first a human, then a scientist.2
62.

Ritts, A Physician's View of Informed Consent in Human Experimentation, 36

FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 638 (1968).

